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THE LAW AND MORALS OF 
INTERPRETATION 
STEPHEN E. SACHS* 
Andrew Coan offers a fresh and forthright response to the long 
disagreement over constitutional interpretation. Instead of entering 
the debate between originalism and nonoriginalism, he proposes to 
settle it, through an amendment proclaiming nonoriginalism as the law 
of the land. Under the Coan Amendment, the entire Constitution 
would be construed “to accommodate the practical exigencies of 
human affairs and the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”1 This Amendment, he writes, would 
“eliminat[e] a huge quantity of basically unproductive debate about the 
legal and moral necessity of originalism,” thereby “redirect[ing]” that 
effort “to far more pressing matters of constitutional substance.”2 
Coan offers his suggestion as a “thought experiment,” not a 
“serious proposal.”3 This is a good thing, because the substantive effect 
of his proposal would be unambiguously bad. But even as a thought 
experiment, it’s unclear how much the Amendment shows. The legal 
debate over the status of originalism can indeed be settled by new law. 
But the moral status of originalism is less tractable, as is that of our law 
more generally. The question Coan would have us consider—“Just how 
strong is the presumptive obligation to follow the law?”4—will not be 
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 1.  Andrew Coan, Amending the Law of Constitutional Interpretation, 13 DUKE J. CONST. 
L. & PUB. POL’Y 83, 85 (2018). 
 2.  Id. at 86. 
 3.  Id. at 101. 
 4.  Id. 
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settled, or even particularly well posed, by a new constitutional 
amendment. 
I. 
Start with the substance. At present, forthright defenses of 
nonoriginalism are found mostly within the academy. Judges and 
officials still claim—with varying degrees of plausibility—that their 
constitutional decisions are rooted in Founding-era law,5 and that “we 
are all originalists.”6 Commitments like these lead some to conclude 
that originalism is actually our positive law,7 a claim that Coan is willing 
for argument’s sake to entertain.8 If nothing else, these claims are 
important to our political culture, and they impose some constraints of 
plausibility on any attempts at legal innovation. 
By contrast, openly declaring our independence from preexisting 
law may open up new doors that can’t easily be closed. After all, 
nothing in the Amendment says that judges are to judge the “exigencies 
of human affairs,” which can involve questions of separation-of-powers 
no less than federalism or individual rights. When the Senate refuses to 
act on a nomination, may the nominee just claim the office anyway, to 
avoid the exigent harm caused by a long vacancy?9 If Congress refuses 
to raise the debt limit, can the President safeguard the economy by 
ordering the Treasury to issue new bonds?10 Could future exigencies 
lead the Joint Chiefs to initiate military action in the face of orders from 
a weak-willed President, as society evolves beyond civilian control of 
the armed forces? Or, if the courts have allowed something that’s 
highly controversial (abortion, affirmative action, what have you), may 
the President conclude that our evolving standards of decency have 
 
 5.  See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (“The generations that wrote 
and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment . . . entrusted to future generations 
a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning.”). 
 6.  The Nomination of Elena Kagan To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 62 (2010) (statement of 
Elena Kagan, Solicitor General) (“[S]ometimes [the Framers] laid down very specific rules. 
Sometimes they laid down broad principles. Either way we apply what they say, what they meant 
to do. So in that sense, we are all originalists.”). 
 7.  See, e.g., William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349 (2015); 
Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817 
(2015). 
 8.  Coan, supra note 1, at 83–84. 
 9.  See Matthew C. Stephenson, Can the President Appoint Principal Executive Officers 
Without a Senate Confirmation Vote?, 122 YALE L.J. 940 (2013). 
 10.  See Louis Michael Seidman, Let’s Give Up on the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 
2012, at A19. 
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evolved to forbid it, and that this extraordinary exigency requires him 
to suspend habeas for any Justices who disagree? 
In raising these questions, the Amendment resembles other 
proposals to extricate modern decisionmaking from the dead hand of 
our ancient law. Louis Michael Seidman, for example, has argued that 
we should “disregard” the Constitution in favor of “arguing about what 
is to be done.”11 But who, exactly, is to make these arguments, and to 
whom are the arguments to be made? Once the Amendment is enacted, 
what are ordinary clerks of court, treasury officials, military officers, or 
U.S. marshals supposed to do when they receive contrary instructions 
from persons claiming to be their superiors? And how are the people 
to judge their representatives, without knowing which powers those 
representatives are supposed to hold? 
We generally find it useful to have legal institutions settle questions 
like these, establishing chains of command in legal decisionmaking 
rather than leaving everything up to the independent judgment (or, 
more likely, the loyalty networks and tribal affiliations) of rank-and-file 
officeholders or private citizens. Maybe the latter must always keep 
some independent legal judgment in reserve—deciding, for example, 
whether a given person really is a government officer, or whether a 
given order really is a “lawful order.”12 Yet the existence and structure 
of the chain of command is usually easier to determine (if only after 
the manner of the drunk looking under the streetlight) than the 
substantive questions the higher-ups have purported to settle. That’s 
one powerful reason why “[w]e the living” find it useful to obey law 
established in the past, because it provides a useful framework for 
governance in the present.13 
We might expect, should the Amendment be adopted, that citizens 
and officeholders would respond to the resulting uncertainty by 
assembling some sort of agreement on such questions, to avoid 
dangerous conflicts in times of crisis. They might want some sort of 
ground rules specifying who answers to who, who gets to do what, and 
whose decisions will be binding on others. Perhaps these rules could be 
preserved in a particular legal document, which could describe, in 
general terms, how the U.S. government is supposed to be constituted. 
A “Constitution of the United States,” if you will. Little might then be 
 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  10 U.S.C. § 892(2) (2012). 
 13.  Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1119, 
1120 (1998). 
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gained by the exercise: we’d only have replaced one constitution with 
another. (One remembers the proposal from Rep. Elliott Levitas, in the 
wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Chadha,14 to convene a 
“Conference on Power Sharing” among the branches of the federal 
government—and the response of the young John Roberts, that there 
had already “been a ‘Conference on Power Sharing’” in “Philadelphia’s 
Constitution Hall in 1787,” and that “someone should tell Levitas about 
it and the ‘report’ it issued.”15) 
This argument can be put too strongly. Originalism doesn’t provide 
determinate answers to every question on which determinacy is 
needed. Viewed purely as an academic pursuit, it often raises more 
questions than it settles.16 If it’s really legal determinacy we want, we 
might be better off applying the original meaning of some other 
country’s constitution, or “the U.S. Constitution with the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments removed,”17 or a simple program of 
parliamentary sovereignty or executive rule-by-decree. 
Instead, what originalism might offer is an account of our law: an 
explanation of why this old constitution’s constraints remain legally 
relevant today, and a solution to the problem “that the choice of 
constraint is [otherwise] so unconstrained.”18 It supplies a framework 
for officials and the public to answer legal questions, one that’s good 
enough for government work,19 and one that lets us adopt new answers 
by explicit amendment before any exigencies set in. Perhaps in a real 
crisis these rules would all go by the wayside; perhaps government 
officials would deliberately ignore them, in the hopes of saving “all the 
laws, but one.”20 Yet the attempt to settle them in advance still has value, 
in the same way that an absolute prohibition on torture (even if it fails 
to dissuade in some ticking-bomb scenarios) can prevent the practice 
from becoming routine.21 Building escape-hatches into the 
 
 14.  462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 15.  Memorandum from John G. Roberts to Fred F. Fielding (Aug. 4, 1983), 
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/levitas.pdf. 
 16.  See Sachs, supra note 7, at 885 (“If we have to go through all this complicated theoretical 
apparatus, and we still don’t know the answers when we’re done, what good is it to originalism?”); 
see also Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713 (2011) (arguing 
that originalism has become more sophisticated but less determinate). 
 17.  Sachs, supra note 7, at 886. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  See generally William Baude, Impure Originalism (July 26, 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
 20.  ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 
LINCOLN: SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 300, 307 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1992). 
 21.  Cf. David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1445 
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constitutional design may be even worse than knowing that officials 
might carve some on their own. 
The question here isn’t just originalism versus nonoriginalism. The 
proposed Amendment offers even less advance guidance on these 
points than do a variety of alternative nonoriginalist theories. An 
amendment that ratified David Strauss’s common-law 
constitutionalism,22 or Bruce Ackerman’s “constitutional moments,”23 
or even Mitch Berman’s “principled positivism,”24 would still rule 
certain things in and certain things out, as a matter of agreed-on social 
principles rather than abstract judgments of what is to be done. 
Importantly, Coan’s proposal doesn’t offer any particular legal 
approach to replace originalism; it says only that, whatever the existing 
rules might be, they can be departed from in order to accommodate 
exigencies. This is nonoriginalism tout court; but it’s not a very helpful 
approach to law. One important purpose of a legal system is to replace 
the “real answers” to policy questions “with fake ones”: “answers that 
hopefully are somewhat close to the real ones, but on which society 
(mostly) agrees and which allow us (mostly) to get along.”25 Maybe the 
fake answers offered by these alternative theories are better than those 
offered by originalism; maybe we could do better by adopting one of 
them instead. But the Amendment proposed here does virtually 
nothing to generate social agreement on which fake answers we should 
use. 
II.  
This refusal to generate social answers is a deliberate feature of the 
proposal, not a bug. It’s crucial to the Amendment’s suggested 
usefulness as a thought experiment. Again, Coan describes the 
Amendment’s payoff as “eliminating a huge quantity of basically 
unproductive debate about the legal and moral necessity of 
originalism,” and “redirect[ing]” this effort “to far more pressing 
 
(2005). 
 22.  See generally DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (Geoffrey R. Stone, 1st 
ed. 2010). 
 23.  See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, De-Schooling Constitutional Law, 123 YALE L.J. 3104, 3121–
22 (2014). 
 24.  Mitchell N. Berman, Our Principled Constitution, 166 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) 
(manuscript at 5), http://ssrn.com/id=2935085. 
 25.  William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 
1096 (2017). 
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matters of constitutional substance.”26 Whether the Amendment would 
achieve this goal, even in theory, depends crucially on whether it can 
transform what we now see as questions of law into questions of morals 
instead. If it can’t achieve that goal—indeed, if no legal enactment 
can—then even as a thought experiment, it may not teach us very much. 
The moral focus of the paper is evident from Coan’s claim that 
nonoriginalism and originalism are importantly asymmetric. He argues 
that “the Constitution could not have been written to compel [an 
originalist] approach,”27 but also that the proposed Amendment could 
succeed in compelling a nonoriginalist one, even for most originalists.28 
What sort of “compel” is this? It’s certainly not a physical “compel.” 
Constitutional amendments are parchment barriers; no matter what 
they say, they can’t reach out and shake you until you comply. Nor is it 
a legal “compel.” Coan isn’t arguing for a Dworkinan moral reading of 
the Constitution, and he agrees that an Originalism Amendment, if 
worded with sufficient clarity, would “pretty clearly be part of the 
positive law.”29 So any debate over the legal necessity of originalism 
could be settled by an Originalism Amendment just as easily as by 
Coan’s proposal. Instead, the only compulsion plausibly at issue here is 
moral compulsion. As Coan argues, whatever the text might demand, 
“constitutional decision-makers would still have good normative 
reasons for ignoring that mandate.”30 And the only debate that the 
Amendment might uniquely claim to help us avoid would have to be 
the moral debate. 
But how could it do that? If all the Amendment did were to replace 
originalism with some other theory of constitutional law—common-
law constitutionalism, say, or constitutional moments—then we’d have 
to face moral debate over that. A Constitutional Moments Amendment 
might equally fail to compel, if there were important moral 
considerations that no constitutional moment had yet recognized. So 
shutting down the debate over originalism, in particular, would be no 
great achievement; we’d just be moving the field of debate somewhere 
else. Even a minor revision to the proposed Amendment, making clear 
that Article III judges have the final say about exigencies, would be no 
less subject than the current system to moral critique. (What if courts 
 
 26.  Coan, supra note 1, at 86. 
 27.  Id. at 85. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. at 89. 
 30.  Id. at 85. 
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lack institutional competence on particular issues? Why should we 
obey judges’ answers to exigent questions, if the answers they provide 
are wrong? Etc.) This is why Coan’s proposal offers nonoriginalism in 
so stark a form: because the only way to force us to confront the “vital 
questions of constitutional substance” is to make them all open for 
revision, all the time.31 
Perhaps that’s part of the point. No matter what the law might be, 
every official and private citizen, at every moment, still has to decide 
what he or she really ought to do. One can’t respond to moral questions 
with legal answers. But the “vital questions of constitutional substance” 
to which Coan would have us turn—questions, presumably, like 
whether the Joint Chiefs should be able to start wars on their own 
hook—are impossible to answer in a vacuum. They presuppose a thick 
context of existing social arrangements, which will inevitably be 
themselves the subject of moral debate. It’s hard to “disregard” these 
arrangements, as Seidman might urge, in favor of “arguing about what 
is to be done,” simply because any precise answers to “what is to be 
done” turn on what social arrangements are already in place. 
And the moral obligations involved will range well beyond 
questions of substance. By way of illustration: Suppose that, on her next 
trip to the archives, a constitutional historian unearths a previously 
unknown Founding-era manuscript. This manuscript provides 
irrefutable evidence (to your own satisfaction) that regulating 
backyard wheat production is outside the original Constitution’s grant 
of federal power. If she publicizes the manuscript’s contents, or if others 
discover it, opponents of federal regulation will seize on the issue, and 
Wickard v. Filburn32 and all its progeny will be overturned—producing 
“a rollback of much of the modern federal regulatory state.”33 To Coan, 
this result would be very bad indeed; so bad, in fact, a judge might be 
morally justified in disregarding an explicit constitutional amendment 
mandating originalism in order to avoid it.34 So what should our 
historian do? Should she report her discovery of the manuscript to the 
world, knowing that others might turn it to bad ends? Or should she 
burn it, before anyone else finds out? 
The question involves more than just the merits of Wickard. For 
example, what norms govern the historian’s role as a member of an 
 
 31.  Coan, supra note 1, at 96. 
 32.  317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942). 
 33.  Coan, supra note 1, at 90. 
 34.  Id. 
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academic community and profession? What specific promises did she 
make to the archivists, just to be allowed into the archives? What 
respect would she owe to the informed choices of her fellow citizens, 
however ill-advised? And so on. 
In the same way, the moral question whether judges and other 
officials should follow preexisting law is always a live one, yet also one 
that’s immensely fact-specific. As with the historian, it might involve 
role-sensitive obligations (such as the constraints of political morality), 
specific promises the officials made to get into their current positions 
of power (such as the Article VI oath),35 the respect they owe to their 
fellow citizens, and many other considerations. Coan notes that even 
“pragmatist judges” would have good reason to avoid “instability and 
disruption of expectations”;36 and surely at least some instability is 
caused by any departure, however minor, from the existing positive law. 
(If originalism were not our positive law, as the French Civil Code is 
not, the judge’s job in rejecting it would be that much easier.) In 
focusing on what is to be done in the future—on the “pressing matters 
of constitutional substance”37—we can’t help thinking, at least a little 
bit, about what the existing law requires; and once we do, we can’t help 
spending time debating whether one ought, morally, to comply. 
Maybe there are some questions to which the substantive moral 
answers are so clear that these situational issues are irrelevant—
questions on which society’s agreement on fake answers is a “covenant 
with death and [an] agreement with hell,”38 which everyone should 
agree must be disobeyed. But most questions, including the question of 
what to do with Wickard, aren’t like this. “What is to be done” might 
often depend, at least in part, on “what the law requires.” And if our 
moral obligations sometimes take account of our legal and social ones, 
then Coan’s thought experiment can’t prevent debate over the moral 
status of our law, because it’s just as embedded within a legal system as 
anything else. Neither rank-and-file officeholders nor private citizens 
can know what they’re supposed to do unless they have some idea what 
everyone else is supposed to do, and this requires some more systemic 
approach. “Do the right thing” is not a very helpful legal rule.39 
 
 35.  See, e.g., Christopher R. Green, “This Constitution”: Constitutional Indexicals as a Basis 
for Textualist Semi-Originalism, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1607, 1638–39 (2009) (discussing the 
oath). 
 36.  Coan, supra note 1, at 90. 
 37.  Id. at 86. 
 38.  The Union, LIBERATOR (Boston, Mass.), Nov. 17, 1843, at 182. 
 39.  See Larry Alexander, Law and Politics: What is Their Relation?, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
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III.  
Even so, “do the right thing” is one injunction we are all required, 
at every moment, to obey. The ultimate question Coan poses is why one 
should care about originalism in the first place. If one doesn’t think that 
originalism is substantively the right thing to do (for reasons of popular 
sovereignty,40 individual rights,41 good consequences,42 the Article VI 
oath,43 etc.), then why use it at all—even if, as Coan is willing to 
assume,44 it reflects our current positive law? “How could anyone care 
very passionately about defending originalism,” if not on substantive 
grounds?45 
This is an odd question to ask academics, who often care 
passionately about strange things like extinct ferns or transfinite sets. 
Perhaps it’s enough for them, as it was for G.H. Hardy, to “have added 
something to knowledge, and helped others to add more.”46 It might 
seem a more appropriate question to ask officials, who force real people 
to comply with their understandings of the law. When raw power is 
involved, the “intellectual feast” of pure legal reasoning is rather 
inadequate support.47 Yet while some accuse positive law of being 
“normatively inert,”48 to the extent that officials are expected to defend 
their actions to others in legal terms, the question of what law currently 
governs us is anything but.49 Positive law may or may not have a claim 
to our obedience, but it certainly has a claim to our honesty. The writer 
of a State Department report, for example, might feel at least some 
obligation to present an accurate discussion of the Armenian Genocide, 
even at the risk of complicating current U.S. relations with the Republic 
 
POL’Y 355, 356 (2018). 
 40.  See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 
VA. L. REV. 1437, 1444–46 (2007); Lawrence B. Solum, Statement of Lawrence B. Solum, Carmack 
Waterhouse Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, 31 DCPE ONLINE 575, 579 
(2017), http://www.dpceonline.it/index.php/dpceonline/article/view/428/417. 
 41.  See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE 
LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE 22–26 (2016). 
 42.  See, e.g., JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE 
GOOD CONSTITUTION 2 (2013). 
 43.  See, e.g., Baude, supra note 7, at 2394–95; Green, supra note 35, at 1638–39; Richard M. 
Re, Promising the Constitution, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 299, 313–05 (2016). 
 44.  Coan, supra note 1, at 83–84. 
 45.  Id. at 99. 
 46.  G.H. HARDY, A MATHEMATICIAN’S APOLOGY 151 (Canto ed. 1992) (1940). 
 47.  See The Bork Hearings; An Intellectual Appetite, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1987, at 50. 
 48.  Jeffrey A. Pojanowski & Kevin C. Walsh, Enduring Originalism, 105 GEO. L.J. 97, 110 
(2016). 
 49.  See Mikołaj Barczentewicz, The Limits of Natural Law Originalism, 93 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 17–19), https:// ssrn.com/id=2955184. 
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of Turkey (or, alternatively, with the Republic of Armenia). So if 
originalism actually is the law, why would we be surprised by people 
saying so, if they happen to think it’s true? Indeed, why would we then 
expect them to say otherwise? 
Coan argues that only the “substantive” fans of originalism would 
have any arguments for “reversing a nonoriginalism amendment—or 
even for lamenting originalism’s demise.”50 But one doesn’t need 
strong priors about the wisdom of current policies to worry that 
particular departures from current law might be unwise. For example, 
one might think that current tax rates are too high, but also think that 
the recent tax cuts were poorly structured, and that in the meantime 
the IRS should collect precisely as much in taxes as current law 
prescribes. In the same way, someone who could take or leave 
originalism as an abstract matter might still think that some particular 
flavor of nonoriginalism might make things worse rather than better, 
and also that the government has good reasons for operating according 
to law. 
The strength of these reasons isn’t lessened by the fact that they rest 
on social convention. To say (as Coan does) that any existing social 
convention favoring originalism “would dissolve like a rope of sand” if 
a “critical mass” of people disapproved strongly of its substance51 is to 
say nothing more than what positivism already admits, namely that 
existing law depends on the existing beliefs and practices of real people 
in real societies. If enough Americans decided tomorrow to pledge 
fealty to the Queen, America would rejoin the British Empire; 
someone who decried the change could still acknowledge it as fact, and 
could also acknowledge the various ways in which these new social 
arrangements might influence one’s moral duties. But we haven’t 
actually rejoined the Empire yet, and this fact matters morally as well 
as politically or legally.52 
IV. 
Again, the point of Coan’s thought experiment is to focus us on a 
fundamental question, one that faces private citizens and officeholders 
 
 50.  Coan, supra note 1, at 99. 
 51.  Id. at 97. 
 52.  Cf. Leslie Green, Introduction to H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, at xxiii (3d ed. 
2012) (noting that Britons might obey Parliament based “not only on a common practice of 
treating [it] as supreme, but also on a belief that this practice is democratic or is central to our 
culture”). 
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alike: “Just how strong is the presumptive obligation to follow the 
law?”53 This question, he argues, has “received comparatively little 
attention from constitutional theorists.”54 While its importance can’t be 
doubted, its obscurity can. My own view is that modern constitutional 
theory already focuses on such questions, perhaps to the point of 
obsession. The primary theme of this scholarship is the “counter-
majoritarian difficulty”55—so much so that we might say, borrowing 
Whitehead’s quip, that modern constitutional theory consists of a series 
of footnotes to Bickel.56 
If anything, it’s the tendency to move quickly from legal duties to 
moral duties, to consider constitutional questions as fundamentally 
normative questions, from which American constitutional scholarship 
needs to break free. The counter-majoritarian difficulty has served so 
effectively as a shiny object to distract law professors because it 
confuses legal and moral issues in this way. What is the long history of 
responses to this difficulty but an attempt to explain how judges might 
make good use of their influence over the law—an influence that’s well 
understood as merely de facto, and not de jure? Except for Sandy 
Levinson,57 no one spends nearly as much time arguing about the 
obvious countermajoritarian difficulty faced by the Senate, because the 
Senate’s role in lawmaking is so obviously lawful. It’s only because the 
Court’s assumed role is not so obviously conferred by positive law that 
it generates endless tortured pages on the duties of the Justices and of 
others to obey them. 
“[W]hether [we have] a moral obligation to obey the law” is a 
“traditional”58 (indeed, ancient)59 question, and it’s not likely to be 
solved specifically by reference to American constitutional law. Maybe 
our constitutional law will turn out to offer useful illustrations or 
examples for the problem. But it’s hardly the central case, and it 
contains an extraordinary number of complicating factors that can 
 
 53.  Coan, supra note 1, at 101. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (2d ed. 1986) (1962). 
 56.  ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY 39 (David Ray Griffin & 
Donald W. Sherburne eds. 1978) (1929). 
 57.  E.g., Sanford Levinson, Still Complacent After All These Years: Some Ruminations on 
the Continuing Need for a “New Political Science,” 89 B.U. L. REV. 409, 417–18 (2009). 
 58.  Frederick Schauer, Deconstructing Law’s Normativity 13 (Nov. 29, 2017), available at 
http://ssrn.com/id=3080437. 
 59.  See SOPHOCLES, Antigone, in THREE THEBAN PLAYS 126, 127–28 (E.F. Watling trans., 
Penguin Books 1974). 
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distract from the issues at hand. The problem of political obligation is 
one best suited for more general philosophical inquiry, using more 
general philosophical tools. By contrast, legal scholars already have a 
good deal to do within their own field, in establishing the content and 
nature of American constitutional law. That may seem less important 
than the problem of political obligation, but perhaps it’s enough to go 
on with. 
 
